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Why is it so difficult to know if national pride leads the way to European identity or prevents it? 
 
Sophie Duchesne (sophie.duchesne@sciences-po.fr) 





For a long time, support for European integration could be analysed without much reference to 
the attachments of European citizens to their nations. Beyond the recurring acknowledgement of the 
strong social determination of attitudes towards Europe, analysts did observe important differences in 
support between European countries, but these were considered as encompassing all sorts of 
differences between these countries; there was no need to infer major differences in the ways different 
peoples of Europe relate to their own country.  
Nowadays, most analysts of European Union consider that the growing process of European 
integration has changed the very nature of attitudes towards Europe. Since 1994 and the setting up of 
European citizenship, support for the European Union should no longer be analysed as tolerant 
attitudes towards a remote and foreign object, and might be addressed as a European identity building 
process. Hence, the question of the relationship between the support for the European Union and the 
commitment of European citizens to their own country should not be avoided anymore (Diez Medrano 
2003). This article will examine over time the relationship between national and European 
commitments, which we will apprehend through the notion of national and European identifications.  
 
Concepts and definitions. 
 
The notion of identity has been deeply criticized in political science
1 because of its diversity of 
meaning and uses (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). However, consistent with the work of Charles Tilly, we 
think that it is better to “get identity right” and to remember that “identities are social arrangements”, 
and consequential ones, resulting from collective negotiations about who people are (Tilly 2003, 
p. 608). At the collective level, we thus consider identity – and in this case national identity –as a 
complex pattern of meanings and values related to the group whose borders are defined by the state’s 
capacity to intervene, and which underlies the varied representations and attitudes of the citizens 
towards each other and towards others (Duchesne, 2003) At the individual level, we take identity to be 
a continuous (re)combination of different identifications, that is, of changing but relatively persistent 
pattern of references to potential groups of belonging (Duchesne & Scherrer 2003). The notion of 
identification that we will use in this text represents the link between a person and the members of one 
of his/her many potential groups of reference. An individual identifies with different groups – and 
hence does have different identifications - while he/she has only one identity which may change over   2
time to a certain extent but is considered basically stable. So the notion of identification with 
someone’s nation or with Europe only refers to whether somebody does in fact feel related to the 
national or European people, whether he/she feels concerned by what happens to them, and whether 
he/she feels him/herself to be part of this citizenry. A person’s identity combines national and 
European identifications with many other possible identifications with groups defined on varied bases 
like gender, generation, race, social class, language, geography, ideology, hobbies, etc. Our focus 
here will be restricted to the way identifications with nation and Europe relate to each other. A similar 
point – the observation that an individual identity is the combination of belonging to diverse groups – is 
made by most analysts of what they nevertheless call European identity (see for example Castano or 
Bruter). We choose to differentiate identity and identification for conceptual clarity of course, but also 
because identification points out to a very important aspect: the current middle term changing 
character of territorial sense of belonging. If nations are ancient enough to make sure that speaking of 
national identity refers to consistent feelings of belonging
2, the EU is too young to have yet given rise 
for sure to deep and consistent feelings of belonging. Writing about European identity may be 
misleading; identification with Europe rightly emphasizes that we are dealing with a process.  
 
Current Alternative Hypotheses 
 
Different hypotheses may be considered regarding the relationship between national 
identifications and the way identification with Europe may develop. Generally speaking, the old dream 
of the EU founding fathers was to see citizens identifying more and more with Europe and eventually 
stopping to identify with their nations – a transfer of attachment that was expected to ward off the 
nationalist conflicts and wars that have cast a shadow over the continent for the last centuries. For the 
time being, this dream has been proved partly wrong by the revival of nationalisms, either in the 
conflicts resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Eastern and Central Europe, or in the long-
standing electoral success of nationalist parties in Western Europe. However, we will consider three 
alternative hypotheses regarding the way identification with Europe grows in a context of persistent 
strong national identifications.  
First, some scholars believe that the European Union marks the start of a new kind of political 
system, free of any kind of exclusive commitment of its citizens– be it because of the development of a 
basic global solidarity or because of the transformation of political decision systems from governments 
to multi-level governance (Meehan 1996; Wiener 1998; Ferry 1998; Neveu 2000, Nicolaidis & 
Weatherill 2003). If this was the case, then identification with Europe – more precisely in this sense 
identification with the European Union – would be an original process, based on different kinds of 
feeling and sense of belonging than former identification with one’s nation. If this hypothesis is valid, 
indicators of national and European identification should be statistically unrelated (hypothesis one).  
Alternatively, other researchers keep considering that identification with Europe develop on a 
similar way that identification with nations developed in the 19
th century, and expect feelings of 
belonging to Europe to be very similar in nature to the way citizens who identify with their nation relate 
to it. Such feelings are moreover considered necessary to legitimate the (European) political system 
and to give rise to much-needed political participation, more particularly, electoral participation. In this 
case, two possibilities remain. Nations may be either considered as standing in the way of European 
integration because the two levels of government tend to compete with each other for the loyalty of 
European citizens (Dogan 1994; Mayer 1996; Carey 04; McLaren 06): in this case, we would expect a 
negative and significant statistical relationship between indicators of European and national 
identification (hypothesis two). Or Europe is rather seen as a complement to the nations, an 
empowerment; Nations thus constitute a kind of model, an incentive framework of we-feeling and 
provide citizens with a tendency to feel and act as members of a political community (Duchesne & 
Frognier 94, 02; Schild 2001, Citrin & Sides 2004; Diez-Medrano 04; Bruter 05). In this later case, we 
would expect a positive and significant statistical relationship between indicators of European and 
national identities (hypothesis three).  
 
As the quoted references indicate, these three hypotheses are indeed supported in the 
literature. The first hypothesis is mainly discussed on a theoretical point of view, but empirical 
evidence is given for the other two. Which means that researchers using empirical data prove both 
that national and European identifications tend to be antagonist and that they tend to be cumulative. 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, although they focus on support to European interaction rather than 
identification with Europe, make a similar conclusion concerning the paradoxical effect of national 
feelings: “The paradox that we identified earlier is apparent: national identity contributes to and   3
diminishes support” (Hooghe & Marks 2004, p.417) The aim of this paper is first to confirm and then 
suggest an interpretation of this apparent paradox.  
 
Indicators and Methodology 
 
If we wish to work on identification, as identification refers to in-depth attitudes compared with 
opinions, we ideally should use a complex variety of indicators that would allow us to distinguish 
between the different dimensions at work in the constitution of attitudes towards Europe and its 
nations. How much do citizens’ attitudes towards Europe and their nation embody a true feeling of 
belonging? How much are these attitudes dependent of cognition and evaluation? How much are they 
a consequence of more general political orientation? How do they reflect extraneous disposition to 
xenophobia and/or openness? Etc. In order to establish the true extent of belonging measured by 
declaration of support to the European Union, one needs indicators that account for a certain degree 
of stability of the measured attitude and its relative independence from current affairs. The analysis of 
such a topic is hence strongly dependant on available data. As most people interested in European 
attitudes, we will use Eurobarometer surveys. We have to admit though that the data are somehow 
disappointing.  
Regarding the measure of identification with one’s nation, we had until very recently to content 
ourselves with a question asked periodically about national pride. Luckily, this question was precisely 
the one that Michelat and Thomas have shown in France, in the sixties, to be the most suitable for 
measuring the feeling of belonging to the national group
3 - a feeling that they proved to be relatively 
independent from the two other main dimensions of national identification: the feeling of superiority of 
one’s nation and the attachment to the nation’s sovereignty. In their data, these other two dimensions 
were highly dependent on a general ideological structure (right/left) contrary to the feeling of belonging 
to the nation. 
Concerning measures of identification with Europe, the situation is more complicated. The 
surveys of the Commission have always asked a series of questions, named “trend questions”, in 
order to measure public opinion towards the European integration process; very few of them related to 
the affective dimension of the individual though, to her/his personal relationship to the community. 
During the eighties
4, they regularly asked one question about respondents’ consciousness to be 
European citizens. This question was worded in such a way that identification with the European 
Community was implicitly considered complementary to identification with one’s nation. This question 
was abandoned in 1992 and replaced by another built on the idea of a possible exclusiveness of the 
two
5. This unfortunate change makes it difficult to assess whether and how the Maastricht Treaty and 
the public debate about its ratification have transformed the relationship between national and 
European identifications. Moreover, the answers to this later question are far from being as stable as a 
measure of identification should be. In the absence of other questions or other datasets of similar 
extent, we will attempt to make some inferences from this survey series over the last twenty years. 
Other questions have been introduced since 2000 that we will use to confirm our analysis. 
Of course, sceptical readers of quantitative survey analysis may wonder about the validity of the 
use of questions and notions that probably take on rather different meanings in each of the studied 
countries, as Juan Diez Medrano brightly showed for Spain, Germany and the UK in Framing Europe 
(2003). We will apply what Jan Van Deth names an “inferential strategy” (J. Van Deth 1998, p.1-20): if 
we observe in the different countries a consistency in the relations between our dependant variables 
(internal consistency) and others (external consistency), we will consider our questions as having at 
least one common dimension of meaning - a dimension that allows us to make comparative analysis - 
despite the various significations that Europe and the nation may have in the many countries of the 
sample. Concretely, this means that we will not set out to analyse and compare the evolutions of the 
levels of answers to these questions, national pride and European identification. Instead we will focus 
the analysis on their statistical relationship. If we can also show some kind of consistency in the 
relations over the time, the hypothesis of validity of the indicator will be even more plausible. 
 






   4
TABLE 1. Correlations between the measures of national pride and European identification (τb de 
Kendall) by country 
 
 
* correlation significant at 5% ; **   correlation significant at 1% 
The samples in Luxemburg and Northern Ireland are smaller, and then the correlations are less likely 
to be significant. 
Note: a positive and significant correlation means that the more someone is proud of one’s nationality, 
the more he/she is likely to feel European 
 
Table 1 provides the correlations
6 between national pride and the correspondent measure of 
European identification – namely “how often do you think of yourself as not only national but also 
European” through to 1988, and then “if you think of yourself in the near future as national only, 
national and European, European and national or only European” from 1994 onwards – for each 
country and each survey. For the first years of analysis, the results are fairly clear: there is hardly any 
statistical relationship between our two indicators. The data clearly demonstrate that when someone 
says that she/he is very proud of her/his nationality, she/he is not less likely to feel her/himself as 
European. In 1982, the rare cases where the Kendall’s tau-b is statistically significant– Belgium, West 
Germany, France, Italy and Luxemburg – the relationship is such that the more someone says that 
she is proud of her country, the more often she is likely to think of herself also as European (see also 
Duchesne & Frognier 1994).  
In 1992 the indicator of European identification changed. The old and the new questions (feeling 
not only national but also European and seeing himself in the near future as national and/or European) 
were asked this very year in the same survey, but not the question on national pride. So we cannot 
evaluate the impact of the change of question on the measure of the relationship between national 
and European identifications. However, in 1994 the interviewees are asked again about both national 
pride and their likeliness to feel European, using the new indicator, and a significant negative 
relationship shows up in most of the studied countries (except Greece, Ireland and Portugal)
7.  
In 1997, a first quick look at the data on the EC level confirms the trend of antagonism: on the 
whole, in the weighted data, 54 % of the people saying that they there are very proud of their nation 
see themselves in the near future as only national, with only 43 % of the people saying that they are 
rather proud, and 38 and 40% of those that are not very or not proud at all. But a closer look at the 
data set shows that this relationship is not stable from one country to the other. Amongst the two-
thirds of countries where the correlation is negative, it is fully significant only in France, Great Britain, 
Luxembourg, Sweden and West Germany. Moreover, in five other countries, namely Belgium, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland and Portugal, the relationship is different: despite the antagonism implied by the question 
between thinking of oneself more as national than European or the opposite, most people in these five 
countries who tend to feel more European than national nevertheless feel proud or very proud of their 
nations. The correlation computed on the European sample is thus partially an artefact. This reminds 
us about the danger of analysing European data as a whole, without referring to the particular 








































Belgium    0.11**  0.03 -0.02  -0.26** 0.09** -0.07*  -0.10** -0.02 -0.04 -0.13**  -0.14**  -0.14**  -0.10** 
Denmark -0.00  0.06  0.04  -0.16**  -0.07*  -0.15**  -0.24**  -0.14**  -0.19**  -0.23**  -0.11**  -0.19**  -0.16** 
West Germany  0.13**  0.06  -0.04  -0.31**  -0.19**  -0.20**  -0.26** -0.16** -0.21**  -0.26**  -0.19**  -0.12*  -0.21** 
Greece -0.2  -0.07  -0.12**  -0.04  0.02  -0.12**  -0.12** -0.01 -0.17** -0.24** -0.21**  -0.07  -0.11** 
Italy 0.07*  0.04  0.00  -0.13**  0.01  -0.12**  -0.06  -0.01  -0.08*  -0.16**  -0.15**  -0.05  -0.13** 
Spain -  -0.01  0.08  -0.21**  -0.07*  -0.20**  -0.25**  -0.18** -0.27**  -0.28**  -0.25** -0.25**  -0.17** 
France 0.12**  0.05  -0.04  -0.17**  -0.13**  -0.21**  -0.16** -0.15** -0.16**  -0.17**  -0.17**  -0.13**  -0.13** 
Ireland 0.01  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  0.02  -0.15**  -0.24**  -0.02  -0.22**  -0.13**  -0.18**  -0.15**  -0.22** 
Northern 
Ireland 
-0.00  -0.01  -0.07  -0.22** -0.10 -0.16*  -0.14 -0.04 -0.11  -0.07 -0.23**  -0.44**  -0.42** 
Luxembourg 0.23**  -0.05  -0.02  -0.09*  -0.15**  -0.19**  -0.21** -0.13** -0.23**  -0.26**  -0.25**  -0.25**  -0.23** 
Netherlands -0.02  -0.08  -0.07  -0.15**  -0.08*  -0.15**  -0.12** -0.18** -0.15**  -0.19**  -0.08**  -0.19**  -0.12** 
Portugal -  -0.01  0.03  -0.01  0.03  -0.05  -0.19**  0.05  -0.12**  -0.16**  -0.22**  0.04  -0.15** 
Great Britain  -0.06  -0.03  -0.05  -0.30**  -0.19**  -0.21**  -0.32** -0.11** -0.26**  -0.26**  -0.22**  -0.22**  -0.20** 
East Germany  -  -  -  -0.25**  -0.06 -0.18**  -0.13**  -0.05  -0.15**  -0.18**  -0.15**  -0.14**  -0.21** 
Finland -  -  -  –  -0.05  -0.06  -0.06  0.03  -0.02  -0.08**  -0.09**  -0.07  -0.03 
Sweden -  -  -  –  -0.10**  -0.17**  -0.18**  -0.15** -0.14**  -0.17**  -0.16** -0.01  -0.09** 
Austria -  -  -  –  -0.06*  -0.17** -0.22**  -0.06* -0.14**  -0.29**  -0.17**  -0.18**  -0.14**   5
While until 1988 the available data tend to support the thesis of the independence of European 
identification from the national one, data from 1994 allow us to suspect a (growing?) antagonism 
between these two levels of identification. Different authors have analysed the 1994 data as a proof of 
a change of nature of European identification: the Maastricht Treaty would have turned mere opinions 
on a remote and vague object (the EC) into a real process of identity building, potentially conflicting 
with other allegiances (Mayer 1997; Blondel, Sinnott & Svensson 1998, Dupoirier et alii 2000). What 
best explains the negative and significant correlations of 1994: the change of question about 
European identification or a change in the very nature of identification with Europe? A third hypothesis 
is possible: a change of context. In 1994, European elections took place that followed the ratification 
and the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty. In that period, nationalist political forces, what the 
French now call “sovereignist”, did their best to make themselves heard and understood. The impact 
of nationalist arguments in electoral rhetoric could account for the strength of the correlations 
observed in the 1994 data; and their following weakening would then be explained by the diminution of 
the public debate as the electoral campaign becomes more distant. If this interpretation is valid - if the 
antagonism between national and European identification is significantly due to the electoral context of 
1994 - we should observe the same kind of effect during similar contexts, as long as the 
corresponding survey questions are available. 
Since 1999, our two basic questions – national pride and thinking of oneself as national and/or 
European – have been asked every year. Moreover, just after the next European election that took 
place in Spring 1999, they were present in three surveys in a row: Autumn 1999, Spring 2000 and 
Autumn 2000. Thus, it makes it possible to compare the evolution of correlations with the period 
1994/1997.  
In 1999, another year with European elections, we observe as in 1994 a rather strong negative 
relationship between our two questions. For the whole (weighted) sample, 58% of the people saying 
that they are very proud of their country think of themselves in the near future only as national, while 
this is the case for 41% only of those who say they are fairly proud of their country, and 38% and 37% 
of those not very or not proud at all of their country. Furthermore the relationship is equivalent, 
negative and significant, for almost all countries (except Belgium, Finland and Portugal). This pattern 
of relationship continues in Spring 2000: again, there is more than 20% difference in the proportion of 
people thinking of themselves in the near future as national only (which means that they do not think 
of themselves as Europeans at all) depending on whether they are very proud or not of their country 
(56% of the very proud against 35% of the rather proud and 34% of both the not very and not proud at 
all). The relationship is significantly negative in almost all countries, except Finland (again) and Italy. 
But things become slightly different by Autumn 2000. The people saying that they are very 
proud of their country are still more likely to think of themselves as only national, but the difference is 
much smaller (6 points instead of 17 in 1999 and 21 in Spring 2000). Perhaps more importantly, the 
relationship becomes more varied across countries. It is fully significant in eight cases out of 
seventeen – mainly the same as in 1997 (West Germany, France, Luxembourg, Great Britain, 
Luxembourg and Sweden) plus Denmark, Spain and the Netherlands. In the other countries, the 
relationship becomes insignificant and the sign even changes in Portugal and Finland. So it seems 
that we observe in 1999 the same effect as in 1994: public debate about the EU has an important 
influence on the nature of the relationship between identification with one’s nation and with Europe. In 
this context, being very proud of one’s nation tends to prevent feeling European while this is not the 
case when the public debate fades. Of course, the time periods between the surveys in the two 
analysed cases are very different, which makes the interpretation less certain; but the effect is striking. 
In 2001, 2002 and 2003, when the two relevant questions are asked again, we observe that the 
correlation between them increases again considerably. In 2002, the Kendall’s tau-B reaches either its 
highest level or levels similar to those from 1994 and early 2000 in every country, except in Ireland 
and Northern Ireland
8; and it remains quasi stable in 2003, for most countries. These strong negative 
correlations from 2001 onwards fit with our interpretation of the preceding fluctuations of the 
relationship between national and European identifications according to the intensity of the debate 
about Europe. In this period, the Euro was introduced in twelve European countries, which brought the 
EC back to the forefront of public debate. This occurred at the same time as the European Convention 
and the debate about the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.  
The pattern of correlations that we observe between our two variables displays a high degree of 
consistency: the shape of the curve of the correlations is very similar from one country to the other 
(cf.chart 1) – which is absolutely not the case if you observe the correlations between national pride 
and some trend indicator of support to European integration
9. It validates a changing relationship 
between national feelings and identification with Europe: when Europe is not a matter of public debate, 
the two belongings – nation and Europe – appear, with our indicators, to be rather independent from   6
one another. Moreover, considering that the question on identification with Europe implies an 
antagonism between the two levels, could thus even be considered slightly cumulative. However when 
the public debate is focused on the EC, because of European elections, ratification of treaties or the 
introduction of the Euro, a strong national pride seems to hamper the growth of identification with 
Europe. As Europe evolves from a remote and administrative loosely identified object to a concrete 
and political system, this second configuration tends to be the norm.  
 
CHART 1.  




























This changing relationship and confusing between national pride and European identification 
could be interpreted as an evidence of the superficiality of the attitudes towards Europe and the 
strength of elites influence on citizens’ self representation. We suggest another interpretation. Instead 
of being the result of the strong influence of elites on weak attitudes, it could be seen as a 
consequence of the complexity of identification processes. In the next section, we will give further 
evidence of this complexity by looking at other indicators of relationships to Europe and the nation, 
and by suggesting an explanation: the duality of territorial identification. 
 
National or European Identifications: Different Processes at Stake 
 
Since Autumn 2000, the Eurobarometer surveys also ask people about how much they feel 
proud of being European, and clearly, except in the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and Greece, 
being proud of one’s nation is far from being incompatible with being proud of Europe (see table 2): in 
the four surveys, on average, more than 80% of the people saying that they are very proud of being 
European also answer that they are very proud of their nation. About two thirds of the respondents 
indicating that they are very proud of their country are also very or fairly proud of being European. 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland are the only countries where the majority of respondents who say 
that they are very proud of their country also say that they are not proud of being European as well. 
 















Belgium    0.38** 0.39** 0.33** 0.29** 0.33** 0.39** 
Denmark  0.37** 0.35** 0.36** 0.35** 0.29** 0.21** 
West  Germany  0.52** 0.46** 0.41** 0.55** 0.36** 0.30** 
Greece  0.27**  0.16** 0.01  0.05 0.12**  0.09** 
Italy  0.33** 0.30** 0.28** 0.33** 0.33** 0.25** 
Spain  0.39** 0.36** 0.34** 0.32** 0.36** 0.25** 
France  0.29** 0.25** 0.20** 0.21** 0.26** 0.20** 
Ireland  0.28** 0.15** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.23** 
Northern Ireland  0.23**  0.12  0.16*  0.09  0.02  -0.17** 
Luxembourg  0.42** 0.31** 0.24** 0.29** 0.33** 0.14** 
Netherlands  0.42** 0.41** 0.33** 0.33** 0.26** 0.25** 
Portugal  0.32** 0.20** 0.22** 0.19** 0.31** 0.21** 
Great  Britain  0.04 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
East  Germany  0.50** 0.41** 0.33** 0.40** 0.39** 0.34** 
Finland  0.33** 0.25** 0.22** 0.28** 0.28** 0.16** 
Sweden  0.38** 0.42** 0.31** 0.36** 0.42** 0.36** 
Austria  0.36** 0.41** 0.29** 0.33** 0.26** 0.36** 
 
 
How can we explain that, at the same time, with the same dataset, we find for almost every 
country (again, except the UK and now Greece), evidence of a negative relationship between national 
pride and European identification while national and European prides are clearly positively related? 
How can a relationship be apparently so highly dependent on the way it is measured and show so 
much consistency in its changes over time? Our explanation is the following: the strength of the 
contextual effect and the changing relationship between national pride and the different measures of 
European identification are a consequence of the duality of the relationship between national and 
European identifications, duality which is basically a characteristic of the very notion of territorial 
identification itself. To identify oneself with one’s nation or any other group defined by a territory 
implies two different processes. First, it assumes one’s tendency to identify with any group; and then it 
implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by this specific territory. At the   9
European level, these two processes of identification may generate contradictory relationships with 
former national identification: the two levels are generally cumulative when the tendency to identify 
with any group is concerned; and potentially competitive when the disposition to identify with a specific 
territorial community is at stake. The interference between these two processes gives rise, when 
observed with aggregated data, to the paradoxical statistical relationship between measures of 
identification with nation and Europe.  
The first process – the tendency to identify with a group - is challenged by the growing 
individualism of modern societies. Norbert Elias (1991) has shown how the recurrent shift of the social 
survival unit from the very local to the nation, then the continent and may be mankind, has resulted in 
growing individualism. The last two decades have shown though that the nation, however abstract or 
constructed it may be, still generates strong feelings of belonging. It seems to remain a very efficient 
source of group identification, of self-representation as the member of a group, which fuels we-feelings 
to other groups, especially to other territories that have an embedded relationship with the nation. In 
this process of we-building, national and European identifications are cumulative: geographers as well 
as political scientists refer to them as “nested identities (Herb & Kaplan 1999; Risse 2001; Medrano & 
Gutiérrez 2001). 
The second process, which implies the propensity to identify with the specific group defined by 
this specific territory, involves the delimitation of the group as a strong constituent of group 
identification. Since Fredrik Barth’s (1969) pioneer work on ethnic identities, the process of other-
building has been considered as a basic characteristic of any kind of identity and a well-documented 
element in the analysis of nation and nationalism, as in Gellner’s most famous work (1983). Here, 
national and European identifications, instead of reinforcing each other, are in a competitive 
relationship. 
We first elaborated this hypothesis of a dual process of identification
10 in reference to a 
qualitative survey about mass-level representations of citizenship conducted at the end of the 1980s in 
France (Duchesne 1997). The in-depth interviews collected for this research led us to consider two 
distinct models of citizenship. The first one was constructed around the very notion of national identity, 
while the second one was built against any form of belonging to a group, be it territorial or not — that 
is, in opposition to any form of group identification. If European integration had only been a step 
forward in the individualisation of societies, as Elias’s later work considers it, we should have found 
Europe mentioned mostly in the second model, by interviewees reluctant to profess any national 
commitment. On the contrary, the interviewees who were more nostalgic of a national interpretation of 
history mentioned it all the more. Europe appeared then as a fallback position against what was not 
yet named “globalisation”; as a defence against the progressive removal of national borders, 
considered by the same people as inevitable, against the dissolution of all the elements that, in their 
perspective, constitutes the basis of personal identity. But they obviously feared, as much as they 
were hoping for them, the changes about to come and expected the change of allegiance from their 
nation to Europe as a difficult one. In this sense, Europe was thus also clearly conceived as an 
“imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” as Benedict 
Anderson famously defined a nation.    
According to us, the analysis of the changing but well-founded relationship between national 
and European identifications presented above may be interpreted as a confirmation of the hypothesis 
elaborated with reference to the French case. Regardless of the distinctive character of each nation, 
the identification with one’s nation as well as the identification in progress with Europe results of, at 
least, two distinct processes: one refers to the disposition of the individual to identify with collectives; 
the second relates to a possible competition between his groups of belonging, which can, under 
certain circumstances, drive him to arbitrate between them. Concerning the relationship between 
national and European identifications, the first process will tend to generate a positive relationship 
between the two as national and European feelings of belonging feed on the same disposition to 
identify with a remote and abstract - or “imagined” – group; while the second process may very well 
give rise to a negative relationship if the two political communities, the national and the European, are 
presented as rivals. This is why the statistical relationship between the two indicators of European and 
national identification varies, according to a consistent pattern, from negative values in context of 
public debate about Europe, when the arguments of Eurosceptics or “souvereignists”
11 are loudly 
expressed, to almost insignificant values the rest of the time, as the two processes – the cumulative 
and the exclusive ones – have effects that may neutralize each other in the measurement of the 
statistical relationship between the national and European commitments. This is also why different 
questions about national and European identifications, if they point out differently to these two different 
processes at stake in territorial identification, may produce opposing statistical relationships between 
the two levels.    10
Let us come back briefly to the introduction and the three hypotheses found out in the literature: 
how does our interpretation fit in this framework? According to us, hypothesis one is ruled out by the 
empirical evidence of a persistent, although complex, statistical relationship between our indicators of 
national and European attachment
12. Hypotheses two and three actually both correspond to our two 
processes of identification: depending on the way elites and the mass media interpret and advertise 
the European system in progress, European citizens will tend to expect from it either an 
encompassing polity aiming to complement and empower the nations or as a powerful political system 
competing with them for sovereignty. The first process – where identifying with Europe means to have 
a disposition to we-feeling – is not so much taken into consideration by the literature. We do believe 
that it matters. 
This idea, that people have a variable disposition to identify with groups defined par territories – 
that is, that there are people for whom the territory does constitute a valid marker of identity and 
others, incapable of this kind of projection, should be tested with data including questions about the 
refusal of any kind of belonging. The Eurobarometer 54.1 (Autumn 2000) and the 60.1 (Autumn 2003) 
provide us with new questions.  In addition to the questions about national and European pride, we 
find a series of questions about the degree of attachment to each of the territories nested in Europe – 
town, region (despite the heterogeneity of these notions in Europe), nation and Europe
13. A simple 
cross tabulation between these various attachments enables us to investigate, once more, the lack of 
antagonism in belonging to these nested territories – and consequently, to confirm that some 
respondents are characterised by a disposition to reject identification to any level of territorial belong.  
 
TABLE 3. Correlations between the measures of attachment to the nation with the measures of 
attachment to the town, the region and Europe (Kendall’s τb) by country.  
EB 54.1, Autumn 2000 
 
 
In 2003 for instance, on the whole sample, 71.5% of the people who say that they are very 
attached to their town also say that they are very attached to their country, 79.5% of those who say so 
about their region are also very attached to their country and this is also the case of 88.9% of the 
interviewees that are very attached to Europe. 
The correlations computed for each country (see table 3) are (almost) all significantly positive 
and are all the stronger between adjacent questions. For instance, correlations between identification 
with town and region tend to be much stronger than correlations between identification with town and 
country or correlations between identification with town and Europe. Although the correlations 
between attachment to the nation and Europe are all weaker than the correlations between the 
attachment to the nation and its infra-territories, they are all significantly positive – apart from Northern 
Ireland 2003. However the strength of the correlation varies strongly from one country to another. In 
some countries, especially Greece, Northern Ireland and Great Britain, the correlations between the 
nation and the European level are much smaller than the correlation with the local levels, while in 
countries like Denmark, East Germany or Sweden, these correlations are very similar. These results 
2000 2003 2004   
Pays  Town Region  Europe Town Region Europe Town Region  Europe
Belgium   0.49**  0.58**  0.42**  0.54** 0.61** 0.29** 0.41** 0.51** 0.36** 
Denmark 0.33**  0.30**  0.27**  0.33**  0.28** 0.21** 0.29** 0.21** 0.12** 
West Germany  0.48**  0.61**  0.47**  0.39** 0.50** 0.36** 0.33** 0.45** 0.36** 
Greece 0.55**  0.68**  0.19**  0.61**  0.74** 0.13** 0.50** 0.60** 0.14** 
Italy 0.38**  0.35**  0.33**  0.46**  0.53** 0.26** 0.50** 0.58** 0.28** 
Spain 0.43**  0.56**  0.34**  0.36**  0.45** 0.28** 0.49** 0.50** 0.33** 
France 0.49**  0.51**  0.26**  0.45**  0.55** 0.19** 0.40** 0.46** 0.21** 
Ireland 0.43**  0.55**  0.27**  0.58**  0.65** 0.20** 0.57** 0.55** 0.19** 
Northern Ireland  0.56**  0.62**  0.15**  0.48**  0.55** 0.03 0.24**  0.34**  0.14** 
Luxembourg 0.50**  0.57**  0.37**  0.50** 0.55** 0.40** 0.57** 0.59** 0.38** 
Netherlands 0.35**  0.39**  0.33**  0.39** 0.46** 0.25** 0.35** 0.36** 0.24** 
Portugal 0.66**  0.68**  0.33**  0.61**  0.68** 0.17** 0.56** 0.63** 0.25** 
Great Britain  0.34**  0.48**  0.17**  0.41** 0.47** 0.12** 0.38** 0.44** 0.09** 
East Germany  0.39**  0.50**  0.47**  0.43** 0.52** 0.40** 0.35** 0.44** 0.47** 
Finland 0.32**  0.39**  0.25**  0.39**  0.42** 0.20** 0.37** 0.44** 0.18** 
Sweden 0.39**  0.48**  0.36**  0.39**  0.47** 0.32** 0.37** 0.42** 0.30** 
Austria 0.56**  0.64**  0.38**  0.61**  0.66** 0.38** 0.45** 0.50** 0.24**   11
are consistent with our finding that Greece, Great Britain and Northern Ireland display a lesser 
tendency towards a cumulative character of national and European identities than other EU countries. 
Our knowledge of the Greek situation does not allow us to make any interpretation of this result. As for 
the UK, we could formulate at least two different hypotheses. First, the cumulative dimension of 
territorial identifications can be activated only for nested territories. Obviously, the UK is not perceived 
by most British citizens as nested in Europe, which is referred to as being abroad; Europe remains an 
“other”, even if sometimes a positive one, in the British context. Secondly, the theory of cumulative 
identification was elaborated from the French case, where the national link refers very much to the 
territory: the French “imagined community” is very much described in territorial terms, the French soil 
being at the same time the scene of common history, the common heritage of French citizens and the 
common graveyard of French people. The first results of a comparative qualitative research on British 
national identity in England do not display the same reference to the British soil as being an imagined 
link between the people. 
Our hypotheses are also consistent with the general decrease of the correlations between the 
attachment to the country and to Europe from 2000 to 2003, and the contrasting variability in the 
pattern of correlations between attachment to the country and to the town and the region, which seem 
to change quite randomly. Referring to the long term analysis of the correlation between national pride 
and our main indicator of identification with Europe, 2000 was considered to be a context of low 
intensity of antagonism while 2003, on the contrary, displays a high level of activation of the 
antagonistic dimension of the two identifications. 
 
Empirical evidence of the dual processes at stake in the identification with Europe 
Let us try to provide some evidence of the duality of the process of identification with Europe. 
We computed a factor analysis of all the sets of variables in our dataset that refer to the territorial 
identification. Both the Eurobarometers of Autumn 2000 and Autumn 2003 contain the following 
questions: national and European prides; degree of attachment to one’s town, region, country and 
Europe and our current indicator of European identification: ‘In the near future do you see yourself as 
(nationality) only, as (nationality) and European, as European and (nationality) or as European only?’. 
This later indicator was coded in two categories, distinguishing between the respondents who declare 
to feel « national only » and the others who declare in a way or another to feel European (see Citrin & 
Sides 2004 for justification). It is called “Eurocitizen”. We display here the analysis using the 2003 
dataset because it is more recent, but the results are very similar to the 2000 ones.   12
 
Chart 2 : Factor analysis of the variables of national and European pride, belonging with town, region, 
nation and Europe and European identification (Eurobarometer 60.1, Autumn 2003) 
 
The factor analysis is a principal component one
14, here with normalisation of variables. Chart 2 
exhibits the two first factors extracting 59,98% o the variance
15. The circle is the circle of correlations 
(equal to one): the more the variables are near this circle, the more their intercorrelations are 
statistically significant. Data values on the graph come from Table 4. 
 
Table 4: First two factor loading 




Nat. Pride  .59  -.06 
Eur. Pride  .42  .71 
Attach Town  .74  -.29 
Attach Reg.  .78  -.28 
Attach Country  .78  -.14 
Attach Eur.  .46  .67 
Eurocitizen -.03  .74 
 
The first factor explains a little more than one third of the variance. It gathers strong and positive 
contributions from all the measures of attachment and pride (with loadings contributing slightly more to 
the factor for the national and subnational entities). Eurocitizen, which is the only indicator that records 
a choice between levels of identification, is also the only variable that hardly loads on the first factor. 
The second factor contains strong positive contributions from the questions concerning Europe and 
negative (although less strong) contributions from all other questions. When the same analysis is done 
at the country level, the results are very similar. The same first two factors appear in the analysis of all 
countries. The interpretation of these two factors is quite straightforward. The first factor refers to the 
cumulative dimension of national and European identification, the social disposition to belong to any 
available territorial group, while the second relates back to the exclusive one, to the potentially 
politically constructed antagonism between two political systems, the European and the traditional 
ones (nation and subnational entites), competing for legitimacy. However, this competition seems a 
little less marked between Europe and nation, than between Europe and local entities
16. 
The problem with this kind of analysis, and chart, is that we postulate a linear relationship 
between the items of each question. In order to check this, we proceeded to a second factor analysis,   13
which deals with items instead of variable: a correspondence analysis. With correspondence analysis, 
basically, two items are close if they represent answers given by the same or similar respondents, that 
is, respondents who give similar answers to the other questions taken into account in the same 
analysis (Lebart et alii, 2006).  
Chart 3 displays the first two dimensions. With correspondence analysis, the points coordinate 
do not necessarily indicate their relative weight. The way items contribute to each dimension is 
indicated as follows: with (1) if they contribute clearly to the first factor, with (2) if they contribute to the 
second one. We need this indication in order to decide if we have to take an item into account in the 
interpretation, its position on the chart is not enough. Lastly, items are represented thanks to triangles 
whose proportion is relative to the number of cases.   
 
Chart 3 : Analyse des correspondances des items relatifs aux questions sur les identités 
 
On the chart, the «  very  » items – very attached to, very proud of any territorial level of 
belonging – are very close to one another, more than the other series - the “fairly”, “not very” and “not 
at all” answers. This means that there is a strong cumulative tendency with this items; while this is less 
the case for the others categories. It means that respondents who says they feel “very attached to” or 
“very proud of” one of their territorial community are likely to feel “very attached to” or “very proud of” 
their others territorial communities too. So if someone says he/she is very proud of his/her nation, 
he/she is likely to feel very proud of being European too, and likely to feel very attached not only to 
his/her nation, but to Europe, his/her region and town as well. While if he/she answers he/she feels 
fairly or not very proud of his/her nation, his/her answers regarding the others questions, and more 
specifically Europe, are less predictable. 
The first factor opposes the “very” items concerning all levels of identification, to the “fairly” and 
“not very” items corresponding to the national and subnational levels – so not concerning Europe. Not 
only this factor opposes strong positive identification to answers with less intensity, but it opposes a 
European, national and subnational nested identification to national and subnational cumulative 
belonging that does not include Europe. 
The second factor is more complicated as it opposes the “fairly attached to” and “fairly proud of” 
Europe and the nation, as well as what we called the Eurocitizens
17, to two series of items: on one 
hand, the item “national only”; on the other hand, the items “not at all attached to” and “not at all proud 
of” Europe and “not very attached to the country”. The combination Europe/nation is thus opposed to 
two different attitudes: on one hand, an exclusive attachment to the nation, on the other hand, a 
rejection of identification – more pronounced vis-à-vis Europe than the nation, but the respondents   14
who declare that they are not at all proud of their nation are actually quite rare in Eurobarometer 
surveys. 
These results confirm the first factor analysis, with the same mix of cumulative and exclusive 
identification. It gives a more complex picture of the possible combinations of identifications though; 
the novelty of identification with Europe plays an important part in the pattern. The first factor 
correspond to the process of identification with any available territorial community: respondent who 
have a strong tendency to identify with one of them are thus likely to identify with any other, including 
Europe; while those who do not tend to identify strongly with traditional levels of belonging do not 
display the same tendency to project themselves in newly made available level of citizenry. We 
confirm here that feeling “very” attached or proud correspond to a different process than less intense 
feeling of belonging (Duchesne & Frognier 1995).  
It is not surprising then that “very” items do not load on the second factor. The second factor 
accounts for the competitive process of identification with different potential sovereign territories, and 
more particularly for the competition between the new European polity and older national and 
subnational political communities. As “very” items are indicators of cumulative tendencies, they do not 
contribute to the second factor.  
According to us, this analysis gives a clear evidence of the complex combination of territorial 
attachments that result from the dual process of identification with a political community, especially 
when a new one develops. The way people of Europe become European – in the subjective sense, 
that is, develop a feeling of belonging to the EU – depends on what the EU means to them. For those 
who have a strong disposition to “we-feeling”, the European Union is likely to be considered an 
encompassing territory in which all other belonging are nested. For others, it is more likely to be 
experienced as a growing power, which competes with older sovereign political communities. In this 
later case, the framing of Europe, the way elites and mass media in the different European countries 
account for European integration, strongly influences people’s disposition to develop a new allegiance 





This paper tries to make sense of the paradoxical statistical relationship between indicators of 
attachment to Europe and its nations. In the literature, some authors comment on a negative 
relationship that they consider a sign persistent nationalistic feeling; while others observe a positive 
relationship that they interpret as the consequence of the complex nature of identities – nested, 
marbled, or multidimensional.  
We suggest stopping to consider European identity as a fact. Instead, we analyse attachment to 
Europe as a process, a process of identification with a new, growing potential political community
18. As 
a consequence, we proceed to a diachronic analysis of indicators of attachment to any territorial 
levels, using Eurobarometer data sets. We show over time that European identification is directly 
related to national identifications, and that the relationship established between these two 
identifications is consistent, despite the fact that it changes according to the context. We interpret the 
changes we observe as a consequence of the duality of the process of identification with territorial 
political communities.  
On one hand, identification is a process that results from the sociologically and politically 
determined individual disposition to feel a member of a community, that is, to feel subjectively involved 
in the community or groups to which someone objectively belongs. In this respect, nations still appear 
to be a powerful vehicle for the development of such a disposition of “we” feeling which, in particular, 
can then be extended to other nested territories such as the European Union. On the other hand, 
identification results from the sociological and political process of community building which is made 
easier by the limitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant “other” 
such as the European Union. In the short term, the exclusive dimension is a direct consequence of the 
actions of national leaders, who endeavour to preserve their power and decision-making space.  
These two processes of national and European identifications interact in such a way that the 
relationship between these two levels of identification is often difficult to spot. From 1994 to 2000, it 
seems possible to trace the effect of European electoral campaigns or other specific public debates 
about the EU. In such periods, the relationship between our indicators of European and national 
identification becomes significantly negative, while in the meantime, the relationship is weaker or non 
significant. In these periods of public debates about the EU, the arguments of national anti-European 
activists activate the potential antagonism between Europe and its nations. Between 1994 and 2000,   15
the only available variable to measure European identification is a question which implies a 
competition between the two levels of belonging, and therefore the activation of this underlying 
antagonism has a strong influence on the relationship between European and national identifications. 
In other contexts, that is, when the public debate about European integration is less acute, we observe 
no statistical relationship between our indicators of national and European identifications. We interpret 
this as a neutralization effect of the two processes at work in territorial identification, the cumulative 
and the competing ones. 
Since 2000, with the Euro, the enlargement and the Convention, public debate about the EU 
has become recurrent. Indeed, the relationship between our former indicators remains significantly 
negative. However the growing questions about the nature of European civic commitment have 
contributed to introduce new questions about European feelings of belonging in the Eurobarometer 
surveys. Thanks to that, we can observe at the same time, with different indicators, a reversed 
relationship between European and national identifications: a significantly positive one. We interpret 
this paradox as complementary evidence for our former interpretation of the dual process of territorial 
identification. 
What are the consequences of these results? From a scientific point of view, it seems pointless 
to continue to dispute the cumulative or competing character of national and European belongings: 
they are both empirically confirmed. We consider more appropriate to analyse in greater depth the 
complex combination of identification processes. The aim would be to find ways to promote a 
European identification in which Europeans feel committed to the EU without being exclusively so. 
Fear of the xenophobic and exclusive attitudes of nationalists have lead promoters of Europe to frame 
the EU as a post national, universalistic forward-looking concept (Soysal 2002). The low turn out to 
European elections, as well as a continuing gap between elites and working class attitudes toward the 
EU may be interpreted as evidence of the relative failure of this strategy. Finding a way to promote the 
cumulative dimension of European identification without the exclusive one would offer another way of 
contributing to European integration. 
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1 On the contrary, this is a central and fully accepted notion in social psychology. Social psychology has strongly influenced the 
concept of European identity. See Breakwell and Lyon 1996 and Herman, Risse and Brewer 2004. 
2 Although globalisation, growing individualism and mass immigration may contribute to erode national identifications 
independently from European integration. 
3 Their research tested almost fifty questions related to national identity (Michelat/Thomas 1966) The Eurobarometer wording is 
slightly different though, due in particular to different modes of giving the questionnaires. The Eurobarometer asks “Would you 
say that you are very proud, rather proud, fairly proud, not at all proud to be (nationality as specified in the first question)”.
 While 
the Michelat/Thomas question was: “Are you proud of being French? Circle the answer corresponding to your answer: always 
proud, proud, in some occasions, never proud.”
  
4 Regularly, if we may say so, as the wording changed quite often. But the sense remained the same, namely: “Do you 
sometimes think of yourself not only as a (nationality) citizen but also as a European citizen? Does it happen often, sometimes 
or never?” 
5.”In the near future do you see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality), European 
only?” 
6 Kendall’s tau-b is one of the most common measure of association for ordinal data. It gives an indication of the strength of the 
relationship between two questions with categorical answers, and of the sense of the relationship (it varies in theory between +1 
and –1, but with such a data set, an absolute value of 0.4 could be considered as a very strong relationship – but this is just rule 
of thumb), with a test of significance of the computed association. 
7 It is interesting to note that this question (“In the near future do you see yourself as (nationality) only, etc.”) is called in the 
pollster jargon the “Moreno question”, from the name of a Spanish political scientist, who currently works on Spanish federalism 
but completed his PhD in Edinburgh. The conflict between nationalist regions and the nation-state is reflected in the question 
and here, extended to a potential conflict between the European nations and the EC.  
8 For Northern Ireland and Luxembourg, the results are to be interpreted carefully as the samples are only 300 and 600 people. 
9 Two students of the French national school of statistics (ENSAE), Jeremiah Just and Jonathan Lagier, have confirmed the 
structure of the relationship between national pride and European identification with a complex model of regression, that is, with 
a fully appropriate statistical tool. For a complete presentation of this supportive evidence, see Duchesne 2004, p.684-687. 
10 Although we considered them at the time as two dimensions of territorial belonging: see Duchesne & Frognier 1995. 
11 As they would be called respectively in the UK and in France 
12 At the mass level: it does not mean that it cannot be true concerning specific segments of population. 
13. “People may feel different degree of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please 
tell me how you feel attached to your town or county, your region, your country, to Europe ? Very attached, fairly attached, not 
very attached or not at all attached ?” 
14 Confirmatory factor analysis like maximum likelihood technique cannot be used as there is communality greater than 1. 
15 The data shows that only the two first factors exhibit an eigenvalue > 1 and the “scree test” go in the same direction 
16 Facing Chart 2, one can easily see that a rotation of the axis does not change the interpretation. A “varimax” or  an “oblique” 
rotation (with a correlation of .102) between the axis (as a doted line on the Chart) offers two factors with positive contributions 
of almost all the variables, but with higher loadings for national and subnational variables for the first factor, and for the 
European variables for the second vis-à-vis national related ones. The distinction between one cumulative factor and one 
oppositional becomes a distinction between two factors with two common cumulative components but also loadings more 
pronounced for the two opposite elements of the former second factor. 
17 That, as we said, combines all declarations of feeling European – national and European, European and national, European 
only… 
18 Although attachment to the nations (and subnational levels) are more ancient, the notion of identification suit them better than 
identities too as we know that they are also the result of a learning process, acquired during the early socialisation phase but 
constantly reactivated by the media. Michael Billig gives strong evidences of this in Banal Nationalism (Billig, 1995).  